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Brain Scans as Evidence:
Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons
by Francis X. Shen*
and Owen D. Jones"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Brain Sciences in the Courtroom Symposium is both timely and
important. Given recently developed and rapidly improving brain
imaging techniques that enable non-invasive detection of brain activity,
civil and criminal courts increasingly encounter attorneys proffering
brain scans as evidence.' The reason is simple. In addition to caring
about how people act-such as when they cause a person's death or sign
a will-the legal system's inquiries frequently turn on determining what
people were thinking, or were capable of thinking, when they acted.
* Visiting Scholar, Vanderbilt University Law School. Associate Director, MacArthur
Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project. University of Chicago (BA, 2000); Harvard
Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2006); Harvard University (Ph. D., 2008).
** New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law & Professor of Biological Sciences,
Vanderbilt University. Director, MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project.
Amherst College (B.A., magna cum laude, 1985); Yale Law School (J.D., 1991).
This Article was prepared with the support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation under Award No. 07-89249-000-HCD.
1. For general introductions to law and neuroscience, see Henry Greely & Anthony
Wagner, Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed., forthcoming 2012); OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D.
SCHALL & FRANCIs X. SHEN, LAW AND THE BRAIN (forthcoming 2013), available at

www.http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lawbrain; MACARTHUR PRIMER ON LAW & NEUROSCIENCE
(Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies, eds., forthcoming 2012); Oliver R. Goodenough &
Micaela Tucker, Law and CognitiveNeuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sci. 61(2010); Owen
D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 5; Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography:NavigatingThe
Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT'L. J. LEG. INFORM. 352 (2010); Stacey A. Tovino,
FunctionalNeuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directionsfor Future Scholarship, 7
AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007). For additional resources, see the home page of the MacArthur
Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project at www.lawneuro.org.
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In criminal law, for example, the same act can yield anything from
mere probation to decades in prison, depending on what the legal fact
finders believe a defendant was probably thinking. In the civil context,
the beliefs held by a defendant about a particular risk are often central
to a plaintiff's recovery. The unavoidable consequence is this: what a
brain was actually doing at the time of an act, and indeed what a brain
in court recollects about past acts, often matters a great deal to the
administration of justice. And in all such such cases, judges and jurors
have it hard. It is simply not easy to read the mind of a stranger or to
assess with complete confidence either the subjective belief or objective
accuracy of expressed recollections.
In all of human and legal history prior to just a few years ago, we
have had to infer what was going on in a person's brain from a
triangulation of circumstances, testimony, and projections of introspections. Against this historical backdrop, modern neuroscientific techniques seem to offer the tantalizing promise of informative, relevant, and
high-tech cranial tours. Although it will rarely, if ever, be the case that
an act of legal relevance is performed as a person is being brain-scanned,
attorneys increasingly think-or hope-that brain scans preceding or
following an act of interest can tell us something legally relevant about
a person's capacities, predispositions, intentions, or frames of mind.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores a particular
context of law and neuroscience: the use of brain scans as evidence of
lying or truth-telling. Part II illustrates the use of those scans by
discussing the landmark 2010 federal criminal trial United States v.
Semrau. That case involved the first federal hearing-which one of us
(Jones) attended-regarding the admissibility of testimony about brain
scans proffered as evidence of whether a person was lying or telling the
truth. Part III identifies five issues relevant to future encounters
between courts and brain scanning evidence. Sufficient scientific
progress in addressing issues of experimental design, ecological and
external validity, ensuring subject compliance with researcher instructions, false memories, and making individual inferences from group data
may one day make brain scan evidence admissible in new legal contexts.
3
But, in the illustrative case of lie detection, not yet.

2. No. 07-10074 JPM (W.D. Tenn. June 17, 2010) (PACER). After a thirteen-day jury
trial, on June 17, 2010, the jury found Semrau guilty on three counts of health care fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006), and not guilty on eleven counts of money laundering
and fifty-seven counts of health care fraud. United States v. Semrau, No. 2:10-cr-10074JPM, 2011 WL 9258, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2011).
3. Judge Pham's Report and Recommendation in Semrau ultimately resulted in the
exclusion of the evidence on the grounds of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (testimony by
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Still, Semrau is a poignant reminder that lawyers need not, and

indeed often will not, wait for neuroscience research consensus before
attempting to introduce brain imaging evidence that may bolster their
clients' cases. The stakes are so high, and the emerging neuroscience
technologies so novel and alluring, that we are likely to see similar cases
more frequently in courtrooms in the years to come. And this means
judges must be ready to evaluate, and lawyers ready to litigate, whether
testimony regarding brain scans should be admitted as evidence for new
and controversial purposes.
II. BRAIN SCANS, LIES, AND IAW
In this section, we provide brief overviews of the main brain-based lie
detection techniques and the scientific and legal contexts for evaluating
them.

A. Brain-BasedLie Detection: Techniques
For centuries, humans have tried to improve their ability to detect
deception by harnessing the latest technological advances.' Brain
scanners as lie detectors are thus understandably alluring and have
generated much discussion in scientific and legal circles.' Although it
experts) and Rule 403 (probative value and unfair prejudice). See Report and Recommendation, United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074 Mi/P (W.D. Tenn. May 31, 2010). After the
Report and Recommendation was submitted on May 31,2010, the defense filed an objection
on June 9, 2010. Defendant's Response to the Government's Motion to Exclude the Usage
of GAO Reports, United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074 Mi/P (W.D. Tenn. June 9, 2010).
On June 10, 2010, the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
adopted the Report and Recommendation and granted the Government's motion in limine
to exclude testimony regarding lie detection tests performed on the defendant. Order
Denying Defendant's Motion To Dismiss, Denying Defendant's Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal/to Dismiss and/or Motion for New Trial, and Denying Defendant's Motion to
Strike at 67, United States v. Semrau, No. 2:10-cr-10074-JPM (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 23, 2010)
[hereinafter Order]. Although the evidentiary ruling has no binding precedential value,
that did not dampen national attention to the case. National media coverage included
Greg Miller, fMRI Lie Detection Failsa Legal Test, 328 SCl. 1336 (2010); Alexis Madrigal,
Eyewitness Account of 'Watershed' Brain Scan Legal Hearing, WIRED SCIENCE (May 17,
2010,7:30 pm), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/05/fmri-daubert; GregMiller, Can
Brain Scans Detect Lying? Exclusive New Details From Court Hearing,SCIENCE MAGAZINE
(May 14, 2010, 12:09 pm), http-/news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/05/can-brainscans-detect-lying-exc.html; Margaret Talbot, Brain Scans on Trial, THE NEW YORKER
(May 25, 2010), http-//www.newyorker.com/online/blogstnewsdesk/2010/05/brain-scans.htm.
4. See, e.g., KEN ALDER, THE LIE DETECTORS: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN OBSESSION
(2007); COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003).

5. See, e.g., Giorgio Ganis & Julian Paul Keenan, The Cognitive Neuroscience of
Deception, 4 Soc. NEUROSCI. 465 (2009). Volume four of Psychology Press's Social
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is beyond the scope of this Article to fully introduce the neuroscience of
lie detection, we offer a few basic observations.
There are two prominent techniques for brain based lie detection.6
The first, electroencephalography (EEG), measures electrical activity in
the brain.' In EEG studies, researchers place electrodes on a subject's
skull to detect, localize, and record electrical activity within the brain as
a subject performs tasks.' The promise, as yet mostly unrealized, is
that such technology could be used to determine-on the basis of

Neuroscience included eight articles, each highlighting a distinct approach to studying the
neural correlates of deception. We recommend this volume for lawyers who want a window
into the advancing science in this area of deception and neural correlation. Recommended
general reviews of neuroscience-based lie detection evidence include EMELIO BiZzI ET AL.,
USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS (2009); Anthony
Wagner, Can Neuroscience Identify Lies?, in A JUDGE'S GUIDE To NEUROSCIENCE: A
CONCISE INTRODUCTION 13 (2010); Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Lie Detection: Is a "Brain Storm" Heading Toward the "Gatekeeper"? 7 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (2007); Paul S. Appelbaum, The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience,
Deception, and the Courts, 58 PSYCHIATRY SERv. 460 (2007); Teneille Brown & Emily
Murphy, Through A Scanner Darkly: FunctionalNeuroimagingas Evidence of a Criminal
Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119 (2010); Henry T. Greely & Judy
Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. &
MED. 377, 378-79 (2007); Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions ofDeception: Neuroimagesand
the Search For Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739 (2009); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science
Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191
(2010); Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to be True? 36 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 491 (2008); Kamila E. Sip, et al., Detecting Deception:The Scope and
Limits, 12 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 48 (2007); Paul R. Wolpe et al., Emerging
Neurotechnologiesfor Lie-Detection:Promises and Perils, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39 (2005).
6. See Ganis & Keenan, supra note 5, at 466; Greely & Mes, supra note 5.
7. It is worth noting that Indian neuroscientist Champadi Raman Mukundan has
developed an EEG procedure known as the Brain Electrical Oscillation Signature (BEOS).
BEOS evidence was used in 2008 to convict a woman of murder in a criminal court in
India. See Maharashtra v. Sharma, No. 508/07 (Ct. Sess. Pune, India June 12, 2008),
http://court.mah.nic.in/courtweb/orders/pundcis/orders2OO1501005082007-1. pdf. In 2010,
however, the Supreme Court of India ruled that compulsory administration of such evidence-narco analysis, brain mapping, and polygraph tests-violates Article 20(3) of the
Constitution of India, INDIA CONST. art. 20(3), which protects the right to silence, and
Article 21, INDIA CONST. art. 21, which guarantees the right to privacy and substantive due
process. Selvi v. Karnataka, No. 1267 of 2004, at *246-49 (India May 5,2010), http//judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx.
8. At least one United States court has encountered this type of lie detection evidence
before. Neuroscientist Lawrence Farwell's "brain fingerprinting" technology, which
measures an electrical signal called the P300 wave (because it occurs about 300 to 600
milliseconds after a stimuli), was admitted by the trial judge in an Iowa case. The neuroscientific testimony was not considered directly on appeal, but the case nonetheless drew
national attention for the very fact that such evidence had been admitted. Greely & Iles,
supra note 5, at 387-88.
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detectable patterns in the electrical signals in a person's brain-when
that person is lying.9
The second technique-the technique at issue in United States v.
Semrau and discussed in the next Part is functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). fMRI detects changes in hemodynamic (literally "blood
movement") properties of the brain as a subject engages in specific
mental tasks.o This technique allows researchers, and thus potentially
courts, to know "which regions of the brain are working, how much, and
for how long, during particular tasks."u
It is important to recognize that what one might learn from an fMRI
study about the truthfulness of a subject depends, critically, on a variety
of factors. These factors include the experimental design (the paradigm
used and the specific set of tasks), proper execution of the design, and
proper interpretation of the results. A number of paradigms, across
many different labs, have been employed to date. These paradigms
include the following: (1) forced-choice lies (for example, responding "yes"
when the truth is "no" and vice-versa), (2) spontaneous lies (for example,
saying "Chicago" when the true answer is "Seattle"), (3) rehearsed and
memorized lies (feigning memory impairment), and (4) several variations
of the so-called "Guilty Knowledge Test" (in which subjects who have
knowledge of the relevant facts will theoretically exhibit different neural
responses to relevant questions as compared to neutral control questions). 2
B.

Brain-BasedLie Detection: Scientific and Legal Views
Scientists and lawyers are engaged in fundamentally different
enterprises, which reflect different goals and guiding principles. In the
domain of science, the question is whether researchers have convincingly
demonstrated that brain-based lie detection techniques yield valid and
reliable results. This question immediately subdivides, however,
according to context.

9. On developments in this technique, see J. Peter Rosenfeld, 'Brain Fingerprinting'
A CriticalAnalysis, 4 Sol. REV. MENTAL HEALTH PRAc. 20 (2005); J. Peter Rosenfeld et al.,
Simple, Effective Countermeasures to P300-Based Tests of Detection of Concealed
Information, 41 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 205 (2004).
10. For an introduction to fMRI for a legal audience, see Jones et al., supra note 1. For
a discussion of fMRI in the context of lie detection, see Marcus E. Raichle, An Introduction
to FunctionalBrainImaging in the Context ofLie Detection, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY
DECEIT, supra note 5, at 3.
11. Jones, supra note 1, 1 17.
12. For a more detailed description of the experimental paradigms used, see Simpson,
supra note 5, at 492-93; Sip et al., supra note 5, at Table 1.
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On one hand, a recent study published in the Proceedings of the
NationalAcademy of Sciences (PNAS) demonstrates quite forcefully that
people who frequently lied about whether they had correctly predicted
the result of a coin toss (reporting accurate predictions at far more
frequently than chance) can be distinguished, by their brain activity
alone, from those who successfully predicted coin flips only at chance
(i.e., roughly 50% of the time)." On the other hand, these results
distinguish a group that often lied from a group that rarely (if ever) lied.
The brain measures did not enable the researchers to identify when a
particular subject was lying on a particular question.
The scientific literature reflects a fairly broad consensus that no brainbased technique is particularly effective for determining whether an
individual is lying in response to a particular question (which, of course,
will generally be the important issue in legal contexts). For example,
neuroscientist Anthony Wagner concluded, in a comprehensive 2010
review of the literature, "that there are no relevant published data that
unambiguously answer whether fMRI-based neuroscience methods can
detect lies at the individual-subject level.""
However, it is essential to recognize that law's concern is not solely
whether the techniques are up to the justifiably robust standards of
science. The law's concern is whether the techniques are meaningfully
better than the next best alternative technique currently deployed in the
legal process," which is often having a group of untrained jurors sit
passively as they watch and listen to witnesses.
Moreover, brain based lie detection could potentially be relevant with
respect to a very wide variety of issues, such as:
- A past act or experience (e.g., I was not at the scene of the crime)

13. Joshua D. Greene & Joseph M. Paxton, PatternsofNeural Activity Associated with
Honest and Dishonest Moral Decisions, 106 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 12506 (2009).
14. Wagner, supra note 5, at 14. Wagner identified and reviewed twenty-eight relevant
"peer reviewed publications reporting unique fMRI or PET data sets that examine brain
responses during putative 'deception versus truth telling.'" Id. at 13. Relatedly, in a 2009
American Academy of Arts and Sciences volume on neuroimaging and lie detection, experts
from both science and law held "a dim view of lie detection with fMRI," finding it
"unreliable" and giving some reason to think that "[iin the case of lie detection through
fMRI, . . . problems seem insurmountable." Bizzi et al., supra note 5, at 2. This is not to
say we have not learned much about the cognitive neuroscience of deception. For instance,
these studies consistently find greater activation in the prefrontal and anterior cingulate
regions of the brain. Wagner, supra note 5, at 15; see also Sip et al., supra note 5, at 50.
Nor is it to say that legal and scientific evidentiary standards should be identical. See
Owen D. Jones, Law, Evolution and the Brain:Applicationsand Open Questions, 359 PHIL.
TRANs. R. Soc'Y LOND. B 1697 (2004).
15. See Jones, Law, Evolution andthe Brain,supra note 14, at 1700-01; Schauer, supra
note 5, at 1191.
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*A current physical state (e.g., I am in pain and am not faking it)
- Eye-witness testimony (e.g., I saw him at the scene of the crime)
- Prediction of future behavior (e.g., at a parole hearing: I do not
intend to do the bad act again)
* Current mental state (e.g., at sentencing: I am remorseful for the
crime I did)
- Past mental state (e.g., I did not knowingly do the bad act).16
Each of these permutes with a particular legal setting (such as a
sentencing hearing, parole hearing, or criminal trial), raising distinct
questions about evidentiary standards, which can-and often do-logically
vary with legal contexts, stakes, and issues.
As a consequence, we believe that when a diversity of scientific
techniques meets a diversity of legal issues and contexts, the legal
system ought to conduct its legal analyses on a case-by-case basis-that
is, with regard to a particular technology, employing a particular
experimental paradigm, applied to a particular question of legal
relevance. We illustrate in the next Part.
III.

A.

UNITED STATES V. SEMRAU

Background

In United States v. Semrau, the government charged psychologist Dr.
Lorne Semrau with Medicare/Medicaid fraud. Proving fraud required
proving that Semrau knowingly violated the law. Semrau's defense was
partly built around brain scan results that allegedly demonstrated he
was telling the truth when he claimed-some years after the fact-that
even though he had incorrectly billed for services, he did not do so
intending to commit fraud. Semrau owned two businesses, each of which
contracted with nursing homes in Tennessee and Mississippi to provide
psychologists and psychiatrists necessary to dispense prescriptions and
provide mental health care. After an investigation by the United States
Attorney's Health Care Fraud Task Force in the Western District of
Tennessee, the government alleged that between 1999 and 2005 Semrau

16. Note too that brain-based lie detection evidence might be offered by either
prosecution or defense or by either party in a civil suit. Indeed, in a 2008 review,
psychiatrist Joseph Simpson observed that "(g]iven the current state of the field and the
unresolved practical matters mentioned herein, the forensic role of the technique is likely
to be limited to the civil arena, with both sides agreeing to have one or more parties
consent to undergo the test." Simpson, supra note 5, at 497. In addition to this list of
courtroom possibilities, it is not hard to imagine an even longer list of theoretically
important uses in related areas, such as interrogation, police investigations, settlement
negotiations, and so on.
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had manipulated Medicare and Medicaid billing codes to inflate
payments, resulting in $3 million worth of fraud."
The central legal question in the case concerned Semrau's mental state
at the time of his acts: between 1999 and 2005, did Semrau "knowingly
devise] a scheme or artifice to defraud a health care benefit program in
connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits,
items, or services"?" To bolster Semrau's credibility in asserting that
he had not knowingly engaged in prohibited billing practices, defense
attorney Houston Gordon contacted Dr. Stephen Laken, founder and
CEO of Cephos Corporation. 9 Since 2004, Dr. Laken had been
developing fMRI lie detection technology, and beginning in 2008 Cephos
marketed the product commercially. During December 2009, Laken
worked with Gordon to develop a set of Specific Incident Questions
(SIQs) that Dr. Semrau would answer in the scanner.20 The questions 2' included, "Did you bill CPT Code 99312 to cheat or defraud

17. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 3-5; United States Attorney's Office
for the Western District ofTennessee, FederalJury Convicts Psychologistfor FalseBillings
to Medicare/Medicaid, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: MEMPHIS (June 28, 2010),
http://memphis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressre1l0/me062810.htm. The Government alleged that
Itlo carry out this scheme, Dr. Semrau directed his billing personnel to bill CPT codes that
were different from the codes marked by the treating psychiatrists, and instructed the
psychiatrists to claim a separate CPT code for AIMS tests." Report & Recommendation,
supra note 3, at 4.
18. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The intent question is most relevant to the fMRI lie detection analysis, so we speak only
to that aspect of the defense in this Article. In addition, however, Semrau argued "that his
actions were reasonable under the circumstances because the CPT codes were confusing
and unclear, and claimled] he followed instructions and guidance provided by CIGNA and
CAHABA representatives." Id. at 5. Dr. Semrau's lawyer was straightforward with the
court that this was a case that would "boil down almost totally to whether or not when Dr.
Semrau takes the stand and testifies as to what he did and why he did it and when he did
it and what he was thinking at the time, whether or not what he's saying is true."
Transcript of Proceedings Volume IV at 63, United States v. Semrau, No.: 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn. May 14, 2010).
19. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 6, 10-11. Cephos's website may be
found at http://www.cephoscorp.com/.
20. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 6, 10-11. Question development
involved rehearsal with Semrau himself. See Transcript of Proceedings Volume I at 68,
United States v. Semrau, No. 07-cr-10774 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2010).
21. In this case, Laken and Gordon developed two sets of SIQs, one for each of two
specific incidents: "The first one was does he believe that he was trying to fraud or was he
trying to commit fraud against the government. And the second one was whether or not
he inappropriately used AIMS [Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale] testing and
whether he was using that in a way that he knew he shouldn't be using that." Transcript
of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 93-94. Dr. Laken readily admitted on the stand
that this overall statement did not allow him to assess truthfulness on any one of the
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Medicare?" and "Did you enter into a scheme to defraud the government
by billing for AIMS tests conducted by psychiatrists under CPT Code
99301?"2 Neutral questions, against which the answers to SIQs would
be compared, were also used.2 ' Examples of neutral questions included,
"Do you like to swim?" and "Are you over age 18?"" The defense and
Laken co-designed the tasks and the SIQs without the knowledge of the
prosecution (a fact that would later factor into the court's analysis).'
On December 30, 2009, Semrau traveled to the Cephos office in
Framingham, Massachusetts, for his initial brain scanning session.2 6
Following data analysis, Laken made two conclusions. First, as to
whether Semrau was being honest when he claimed that he had not
knowingly defrauded the government, Laken concluded that "[ilt
appeared his brain showed that he was telling the truth." Second, as to
whether Semrau knew he was incorrectly billing for services that should
not have been separately billed, Laken found that "it appeared that he
This second
was lying when he said he was telling the truth."
conclusion was obviously not the result Semrau's defense team wanted.
After analyzing the data further, Laken contacted Gordon's office and
offered to do a third scan, specifically on the second issue of whether
Semrau had knowingly incorrectly billed for certain psychiatric tests
administered. Laken justified the additional scan on the grounds that
Semrau was fatigued for the second scan, and this may have invalidated
the results. 28 Laken shortened the questions for the third scan,
conducted on January 12, 2010. After the third scan, Laken newly
concluded that "we believe that Dr. Semrau's brain indicates that he was
telling the truth when he said that he is telling the truth about not
inappropriately performing AIMS testing."'
In light of these brain scan results, the defense team decided to have
Laken testify. To clarify, Laken was not offered as a witness who could
testify directly about Semrau's past mental state. Instead, he was to

questions individually. Id. at 137-40.
22. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 12-13.
23. Transcript of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 72. "Control" questions were
also employed, but Dr. Laken testified that they were only used as space fillers and
answers to the control questions did not factor into the analysis. Id.
24. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 11 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 14.
27. Transcript of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 95.
28. Id. at 96, 152. Laken admitted that fatigue could have made the first scan
inaccurate too. Id. at 152.
29. Id. at 97.

870

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

testify about the truthfulness of Semrau's claim in December 2009 and
January 2010, concerning his state of mind between 1999 and 2005.0
As Laken stated, "What we can say is . .. he believes that he is telling
the truth."
Verifying the truthfulness of a belief, of course, doesn't provide the
court with information on so-called "ground truth"-that is, whether the
belief is true to begin with. Rather, as Laken explained, "If[experimental subjects] say that this is the truth, then I believe them that this is
the truth. At least that's what they are telling me is the truth. These are
the truths of the statements."32 The truth of Semrau's statements about
mental states is, of course, distinct from the fact relevant to the case:
Semrau's actual mental states at the time of the billing.
B.

The Admissibility of the Evidence
On May 13 and 14, 2010, United States Magistrate Judge Tu Pham
conducted a hearing on whether the brain-based lie detection evidence
should, at a later date, be heard by the empanelled jury.'
Laken
testified for the defense. Dr. Marc Raichle, a neuroscientist at Washington University in St. Louis, and Dr. Peter Imrey, a biostatistician of the
Cleveland Clinic, were rebuttal witnesses for the government.
Judge Pham considered both the relevance of Laken's proferred
testimony, under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and its
probative value, under Rule 403. In applying Rule 702, federal courts
perform a two-prong gatekeeping role for expert scientific evidence by
first evaluating the reliability and then the relevance of the testimo-

30. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 19 n. 15.
31. Transcript of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 99.
32. Id. at 70-71 (emphasis added).
33. Laken made clear on the stand that his data were not meant to supplant other
forensic evidence, but simply to improve, even if slightly, one's assessment of Semrau's
truthfulness. Transcript of Proceedings Volume II at 237, United States v. Semrau, No. 07cr-10774 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2010).
34. In federal courts such hearings are known as "Daubert" hearings because federal
court judges evaluate scientific evidence according to the principles laid out by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993). For more on Daubert in the context of brain science, see Edward J.
Imwinkelried, SerendipitousTiming: The CoincidentalEmergence ofthe New BrainScience
and the Advent of an EpistemologicalApproach to Determiningthe Admissibility of Expert
Testimony, 62 MERCER L. REV. 959 (2011). For a more general discussion, see DAVID L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAw AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMoNY (2010-2011 ed. 2010).

35. Disclosure: both of these witnesses are known to the Authors as colleagues within
the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project.
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ny." Because the court did not find the proffered testimony in Semrau
to be reliable, it did not reach the relevance prong, and thus we exclude
the latter from our discussion.
In assessing reliability, the court's analysis applied the Daubert test
and considered four, non-exclusive factors:
(1) whether the theory or technique can be tested and has been
tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the
method used and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether the theory or
method has been generally accepted by the scientific community."
Judge Pham found that factors one and two were satisfied, while factors
three and four were not.' Judge Pham concluded that "at least at this
early stage in its development, fMRI-based lie detection does not satisfy
the requirements of Rule 702."'9
Judge Pham's Report and Recommendation was, in our view,
thorough, well reasoned, and correct in its conclusions on each of these
four factors. 40 There was relatively little dispute that the theory and
technique presented by Laken had indeed been tested, and that the
defense won on the issue of peer review.'
As to whether the error rates are known, however, the defense
arguments were not as strong. Analogizing to a polygraph case from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v.

36. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
37. Id. at 22 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; First Tenn. Bank Nat'1 Ass'n v.
Barreto, 268 F.3d 319, 334 (6th Cir. 2001)).
38. Id. at 24-33. It might also be the case that even if fMRI lie detection evidence
passes the Daubert hurdle, it may still face a hearsay objection. For a discussion of this
possibility, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Significance (if Any) for the Federal Criminal Justice
System ofAdvances in Lie Detector Technology, 80 TEMP. L. REv. 711 (2007).
39. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 25.
40. Judge John McCalla held the same view when evaluating the defense's motion for
a new trial. See Order, supra note 3. One of the arguments for a new trial was the
exclusion of the lie detection evidence, but Judge McCalla found that the testimony was
properly excluded on both Rule 702 and Rule 403 grounds. Id.
41. See Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 25-26. In a single paragraph in
the Report and Recommendation, Judge Pham found that
the underlying theories behind fMRI-based lie detection are capable of being
tested, and at least in the laboratory setting, have been subjected to some level of
testing. It also appears that the theories have been subjected to some peer review
and publication, particularly within the last five years, as evidenced by the
articles coauthored by Dr. Laken.
Id.
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Cordoba,42 Judge Pham ruled that "[hlere, like in Cordoba, the error
rate of real-life fMRI-based lie detection is unknown."" Moreover,
Judge Pham was troubled by Laken's choice to do a third brain-scan test
(following an uncomfortable finding), when the protocol had only called
for two." Judge Pham observed that Laken's "decision to conduct a
third test begs the question whether a fourth scan would have revealed
Dr. Semrau to be deceptive again." Judge Pham found that "lack of
controlling standards in the industry for real-life exams, and Dr. Laken's
apparent deviation from his own protocols are negative factors in the
analysis of whether fMRI-based lie detection is scientifically valid."
On the issue of general acceptance, the defense argued that in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, "general acceptance
within a particular scientific community does not mean unanimity or
consensus. " The Government countered that scholars viewed neuroscience lie detection generally, and Cephos's technology in particular, as
not ready for courtroom use.' Judge Pham was persuaded and in his
Report and Recommendation quoted several scholarly articles to support
his conclusion that "[n]o doubt in part because of its recent development,
fMRI-based lie detection has not yet been accepted by the scientific
community."
Finally, and independently under Rule 403, the court agreed "that the
probative value of Dr. Laken's testimony is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice to the government."o This was due in
part to the fact that the fMRI test was obtained unilaterally." Judge
Pham also emphasized that because of the inability of the Cephos tests

42. 194 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
43. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 28.
44. Id. at 31-32.
45. Id. at 32.
46. Id.
47. Transcript of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 9.
48. Supplement to United States' Motion in Limine and Memorandum in Support to
Exclude Defendant's Expert Witness Testimony of Dr. Steven Laken and Request by the
United States for a Daubert Hearing, United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074-Mi (W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 24, 2010) (hereinafter Supplement].
49. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 32-33.
50. Id. at 34. In making its 403 ruling, the court relied on United States v. Sherlin, 67
F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1999).
Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 34.
51. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 34. Judge Pham observed, "While
the Sixth Circuit. . . has not addressed fMRI-based lie detection specifically, courts in this
circuit have consistently found that the high risk of unfair prejudice associated with the
admission of testimony regarding unilaterally obtained polygraph results will preclude such
testimony from being admissible." Id.
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to provide the court with information on Semrau's truthfulness on
particular questions (and not just overall), exclusion under Rule 402 was
"particularly appropriate."52 Indeed, during Dr. Laken's cross-examination by U.S. Attorney Stuart Canale, Dr. Laken readily admitted that it

was possible that Semrau might have been lying on some of the specific
incident questions.a In addition, the Government, citing United States
v. Scheffer, 4 argued that "[ilt is simply infringing on the province of
the jury to make the ultimate credibility determination of testimony."
Despite their many disagreements, Judge Pham and both sides agreed
that the neuroscience in this area is fluid and that someday the science
might advance enough to pass the Daubert test. As Judge Pham
explained,
[In the future, should fMRI-based lie detection undergo further
testing, development, and peer review, improve upon standards
controlling the technique's operation, and gain acceptance by the
scientific community for use in the real world, this methodology may
be found to be admissible even if the error rate is not able to be
quantified in a real world setting.'
Brain-based lie detection evidence may also arise in legal contexts
quite different from Semrau, in which evidentiary rules and substantive
issues will require distinct analyses." We should also remember that
legal change might come from legislative action rather than a judge's

52. Id. at 38. The court reasoned that "[blased on his inability to identify which SIQs
Dr. Semrau answered truthfully or deceptively, the court fails to see how his testimony can
assist the jury in deciding whether Dr. Semrau's testimony is credible." Id.
53. Transcript of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 138. The court thus reasoned
that "based on his inability to identify which SIQs Dr. Semrau answered truthfully or
deceptively, the court fails to see how his testimony can assist the jury in deciding whether
Dr. Semrau's testimony is credible." Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 33.
54. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
55. Transcript of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 12-13. As Justice Thomas
wrote in Scheffer, a case upholding a military evidentiary rule excluding polygraph
evidence in court-martial proceedings, "Afundamental premise of our criminal trial system
is that'the jury is the lie detector.'" 523 U.S. at 313 (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490
F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)). "Determining the weight and credibility of witness
testimony, therefore, has long been held to be the part of every case [that] belongs to the
jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and their practical
knowledge of men and the ways of men." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 31 n.18.
57. Indeed, the summer of 2010 also saw an attempt in New York to introduce similar
evidence. See Wilson v. Corestaff, 900 N.Y. S.2d 639,640, 642 (Sup. Ct. 2010). During his
testimony, Dr. Laken also referenced testifying in a South Carolina post-conviction relief
case. Transcript of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 119-20.
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chambers. Already at least one state (New York) has a state legislator
who has proposed a modification to state law that would exclude certain
types of brain-based lie detection evidence from being admissible in
certain situations.s"
IV. FIVE ISSUES AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY
The analysis of admissibility of brain-scanning evidence in United
States v. Semrau was relatively straightforward in the end. A close
study of the case and transcript, however, in light of the brain-based lie
detection literature to date, suggests there are a number of broader
issues that will-or at least should-emerge when courts consider the
admissibility of testimony regarding brain scans. Here we identify, and
then briefly explain, five of issues: (1) What did the experimental task
actually measure? (2) How "ecologically valid" and "externally valid"
were the experimental conditions? (3) To what extent did the subject or
subjects of interest complete the tasks in the scanner as instructed by
the researchers? (4) What statistical procedures were used, and how
well do these procedures support the claims being made? (5) If groupaveraged data were proffered, can one draw from them legitimate
inferences about this one individual?
What Did the Experimental Task Actually Measure?
Some brain scans are purely anatomical. (Examples include x-rays
and CT-scans). They are intended to show the physical condition of the
brain in ways that, at times (such as when there is massive tissue
damage), can lead to inferences about function. Other brain scanning
techniques, of the sort described earlier in this Article, are both
anatomical and-in particular-functional. That is, they provide data
about what the brain is actually doing, moment by moment, as it
performs specific tasks under precise experimental conditions.
In the latter case, the courtroom usefulness of an assessment of brain
function depends not just intimately-but virtually entirely-on a logical
and demonstrable connection between the tasks as performed in the
scanner and the legal issue at hand. Put another way, statistically
1.

58. In 2009 New York Assemblyman Michael Benjamin proposed bill A9154: "An act
to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to admissibility of magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) brain scans in criminal proceedings." H.R. A9154, 2009 Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2009) (unenacted). The stated purpose of the bill was "[tlo ban the use of magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) brain scans in a criminal proceeding where a defendant's or
witness's truthfulness or knowledge of a specific event is at issue." Michael Benjamin, New
York State Assembly: Memorandum in Support of Legislation, N.Y. STATE LEGISLATURE
(Sept. 22, 2009), http//public.leginfo.state.ny.us.
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significant findings may advance a scientific field but can only be as
legally meaningful as the legal appropriateness of the experimental
protocols allows. Specifically, it's a question of: was the brain actually
doing what the expert testifying in court claims it was doing during the
experiment?
For instance, to illustrate with lie detection, can one be reasonably
sure that the brain activation pattern being reported is being caused by
"lying" (or the absence of lying) as opposed to being caused by some
other mental process? In the case of lie detection, one fundamental
challenge to courtroom applicability is that the majority of neuroscience
lie detection research to date has relied on an "instructed lie" experimental paradigm in which researchers tell subjects when to be dishonest in
the scanner. 9 It is not clear whether, when using an instructed lie
paradigm, courts can draw credible inferences about real world "lying."
Neuroscientist Nancy Kanwisher argues that "making a false response
when you are instructed to do so isn't a lie, and it's not deception. It's
simply doing what you are told. We could call it an 'instructed falsehood."'6 o Neuroscientist Kamila E. Sip and her colleagues similarly
argue that "Itihe absence of this intentional aspect of deception in the
experiments is ... more than a mere experimental confound."6 It
fundamentally changes what the brain is being asked to do. Researchers, in this view, are indeed measuring something, but they are not
necessarily measuring lying.62
Second, courts should pay great attention to the interaction of
deception detection and memory. It is not hard for any of us to imagine
a time when we may have "lied" without knowing it. Thus, courts must
be assured that the proffered evidence can distinguish between the
mental processes of (1) mis-remembering but not deliberately lying vs.
(2) remembering correctly, but deliberately lying. Moreover, we do not

59. See, e.g., Sip et al., supra note 5.
60. Nancy Kanwisher, The Use of fMRI in Lie Detection: What Has Been Shown and
What Has Not, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 5, at 7, 12.

61. Sip et al., supra note 5, at 48.
62. Laken's position in Semrau was that "[a] lie is the intentional act of deceit," and
that even when instructed to do so, subjects are still intentionally deceiving. Transcript
of Proceedings Volume I, supra note 20, at 159. Instructed lies, in Laken's view, are real
lies. Id. Because this view is contested, however, courts must be attuned to what
researchers are telling subjects to do in the fMRI scanner. When this question comes up
in future litigation, new research may address these issues. This is a problem that can be
corrected through improved experimental paradigms. See Sip et al., supra note 5, at 52
(noting that "the field will benefit from the study of this aspect of deception in isolation").
Indeed, at least one fMRI study that we are aware of has developed a novel method to
address this issue and uncover real, non-instructed lies. See Greene & Paxton, supra note
13.
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yet know how rehearsal of a lie over time involving activation of memory
Until we better understand the
systems affects brain chemistry.
retrieval, courts should be
memory
and
relationship between deception
very wary of accepting evidence about truthfulness related to long-past
events.
Finally, the areas of brain activation associated with a particular
experimental task may be part of a general neural system. In other
words, researchers may not have isolated the particular system they
claim to have isolated." If an area-or areas-of activation are not
specific to the legally relevant mental process, then we are left unable
to disambiguate it from other mental processes that might cause the
observed brain activation pattern.
As this discussion illustrates, courts will have multiple reasons to
closely consider whether the proffered brain scanning evidence-however
accepted the technique is generally-resulted from experimental
procedures that were designed to effectively isolate the brain activity
associated with the specific issue of legal relevance.
2. How "EcologicallyValid" and "Externally Valid" were the Experimental Conditions?
Courts want to know how useful proferred evidence may be to
resolving a contested legal issue. Consequently, when encountering
brain-scan evidence, courts will want to approach questions of admissibility with a skeptic's eye for assessing ecological and external validity.
A study's ecological validity is a measure of how well the laboratory
conditions mimic real-world situations. A study's external validity is a
measure of the ability to generalize about lab findings to the population
or individual of interest. Although high ecological validity may often
63. It is possible "that memory processes, rather than deception, may account for grouplevel effects in some studies of deception." Wagner, supra note 5, at 20. For general
discussion of memory as a complicated-and often mistaken-process of re-remembering and
re-storing, see DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: How THE MIND
FORGETS AND REMEMBERS (2002); Nobuhito Abe et al., Neural Correlatesof True Memory,
False Memory, and Deception, 18 CEREBRAL CORTEX 2811 (2008); Elizabeth F. Loftus,
PlantingMisinformation in the Human Mind: A 30-Year Investigation of the Malleability
Of Memory, 12 LEARNING & MEMORY 361 (2005).
64. In the context of lie detection, these general systems, as Dr. Raichle described them
in his testimony, may be "systems concerned with attention switching and salience and
working memory. . . . So in and of itself, these are not unique to lie detection itself."
Transcript of Proceedings Volume II, supra note 33, at 265. Dr. Raichle later made a
similar point: "[Tihis paradigm doesn't stand in isolation from neuroscience or cognitive
neuroscience. It stands in juxtaposition or as part of an overall scientific investigation that
has dealt with these systems and paradigms that are remarkably close to the ones he's
talking about that have nothing to do with lie detection." Id. at 312.
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correlate positively with high external validity, this is not always the
case and, therefore, the two issues should both be considered.' Using
brain-based lie detection as an example, it has been noted that no
laboratory study has been able to replicate the real-world, ecologicallyvalid stakes-such as avoiding imprisonment-that often accompany
lying.66 In Semrau, when Dr. Laken was asked on cross-examination
about ecological validity, he replied,
whether they're lying about biographical things, whether they're lying
because they've been told a lie or not told a lie, whether they're lying
about playing cards-all of these things seem to be activating the same
region. So it appears that irregardless of what type of lie, the same
brain regions are out there.67
This statement reflects an assumption that a lie-whether told in a
scanner without consequence or in the real world with great consequence-should always be expected to activate the same brain regions.
While theoretically plausible, such an assumption is not generally
accepted.
As to external validity in Semrau, the Government pointed out that
although the algorithm developed by Laken was created from laboratory
studies of subjects between the ages of eighteen and fifty, Semrau was
sixty-three.68 This raised the question whether fMRI results from
younger cohorts could validly serve as reference points for someone
considerably older. During cross-examination, Assistant United States
Attorney Canale hit upon this age effect, asking Laken, "So the
application of your technology to somebody who is 63 years old is
unknown?" to which Laken replied, "Is unknown. That's correct."69

65. For instance, a mock jury study may have great ecological validity if its
experimental conditions mimicked real-world conditions, but still have poor external
validity for a general population if it used only college students.
66. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 22. Neuroscientist Elizabeth Phelps argues,
This problem of applying laboratory findings to other, more everyday and/or
personally relevant and important circumstances is a challenge for all studies of
human behavior. However, addressing this challenge becomes especially critical
when we attempt to use our laboratory findings to generate techniques that can
potentially impact individuals' legal rights. Until this challenge can be addressed,
the use of IMRI for lie detection should remain a research topic, instead of a legal
tool.
Elizabeth A. Phelps, Lying Outside the Laboratory:The Impact of Imagery and Emotion on
the Neural Circuitry of Lie Detection, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note

5, at 14, 20.
67. Transcript of Proceedings Volume IV, supra note 18, at 39-40.
68. Id. at 66.
69. Transcript of Proceedings Volume II, supra note 33, at 190.
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Judge Pham cited this exchange in a footnote in his Report and
Recommendation,70 and we expect that concerns about external validity
will be a part of every attempt to introduce neuroscience based lie
detection evidence.
In every legal context in which functional brain-scan evidence is
offered, courts must inquire about ecological and external validity. To
be legally relevant, the experimental design must be close enough to
real-world conditions to be applicable to the case, and the researcher
must be able to credibly generalize from the subjects on which the
experiments were conducted to the subject or subjects of interest in the
courtroom.
3. To What Extent Did the Subject or Subjects of Interest Complete
the Tasks in the Scanner as Instructed by the Researchers?
In any functional brain imaging experiment, researchers must ensure,
sometimes going to great lengths, that their research subjects in the
scanner complete the tasks as instructed. For example, subjects are
always instructed to remain still in the fMRI scanner because movement
during scan acquisition may make the resulting data unusable. 1 Data
from subjects who are unable to remain sufficiently motionless cannot
be readily interpreted.
While moving in the scanner is typically not done intentionally,
subjects may also choose, for a variety of reasons, not to follow the
researcher's instructions. Some of this may be due to relatively innocent
motives-for example, wanting to get through the experiment as quickly
as possible by clicking a response button and not carefully listening to
directions. A subject may, however, intentionally engage in countermeasures by behaving in the scanner in a way that is antithetical to the
instructions given. Thus, when encountering brain-based evidence, courts
must consider how readily the researchers could have detected noncompliance with their instructions.
Lie detection provides a clear illustration of this general point. In its
review of the polygraph, a National Academies expert panel found that
"[clountermeasures pose a potentially serious threat to the performance
of polygraph testing because all the physiological indicators measured
by the polygraph can be altered by conscious efforts through cognitive or

70. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 29 n.17.
71. Cameron S. Carter et al., Optimizing the Design andAnalysis of ClinicalFunctional
Magnetic Resonance ImagingResearch Studies, 64 BIoLoGICAL PSYCHIATRY 842,845 (2008)
(noting that although data analysis programs can correct for between-scan subject
movement, movement during scanning can still pose a significant problem for the signal-tonoise ratio).
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physical means."72 The same concerns should be raised about brainbased lie detection because we simply don't know enough about the
potential effectiveness of fMRI countermeasures.73
Courts will be confronted with the question of whether fMRI lie
detection is analogous to-or distinguishable from-its polygraph
precursor. In the words of attorney Houston Gordon, the defense in
Semrau claimed that, unlike an individual who can alter his polygraph
test, in a brain scanner a subject "can't manipulate his brain."74 The
Government disagreed, and the court rightly analogized in this case to
the polygraph.7 ' As the science of brain-based lie detection techniques
advances, however, courts will need to revisit the polygraph analogy
question.
Beyond the lie detection context, courts must also be aware not only
of all other subject-specific behavior in the scanner-for example,
movement or failure to comprehend instructions-that may invalidate the
results and thus the proffered interpretation of the brain-scan evidence.
The experimental design must be executed properly.
4. What StatisticalProcedures were Used, and How Well do These
Procedures Support the Claims Being Made?
A large number of complex statistical analyses are used to translate
data obtained from a brain-scanning device into a graphical image
displayed in court. 76 Thus, there are a correspondingly large number
72. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 4.
73. Greely & Iles, supra note 5, at 404-05.
74. Transcript of Proceedings Volume IV, supra note 18, at 64. Laken addressed
countermeasures at length during cross-examination, stating that
we make countermeasures into two different types of countermeasures, physical
countermeasures and mental countermeasures. So physical countermeasures are
things like moving your fingers or your toes, and mental countermeasures are
pretending like you're in a church or you didn't do what it is that you say that you
did do. And in the studies that we have done, we encourage people to commit
countermeasures. We say, by the way, if you beat us, you get extra money. So do
whatever it takes. Now, we don't know what countermeasures are because I
certainly don't. I have no idea how to activate my anterior cingulate.
Transcript of Proceedings Volume II, supra note 33, at 240-41. In his closing argument,
defense attorney Gordon argued that the fMRI lie detection evidence was
hard scientific evidence as opposed to somebody's subjective supposition of what
took place.... There's nothing that Dr. Laken does to manipulate it, and there's
nothing that Dr. Semrau can do to manipulate it. So it's not the same thing as the
polygraph, even though the Government wants to make it that way.
Transcript of Proceedings Volume IV, supra note 18, at 64-65.
75. See Semrau, No. 07-10074 JPM.
76. For an introduction to the types of statistical procedures used, see Jones et al.,
supra note 1.
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of questions that can be asked about the validity of these statistical
procedures. In general, as in any problem of statistical inference, a court
should be made aware of the assumptions and conventions being
employed in an analysis, as well as the statistical uncertainty of the
researcher's conclusions." In short, courts need to understand the
validity of the statistical analyses producing the brain images and their
interpretation.
To illustrate using Semrau, biostatistician Dr. Peter Imrey usefully
defined validity as "the extent to which one can exclude: reverse
causation, chance, selection, measurement bias, confounding bias from
study conclusions, and theoretically justify a generalization to contexts
outside the specific." We have touched on many of these validity
issues, all of which should be addressed by courts in future litigation on
neuroscience evidence. In addition, courts may find it useful to consider
the following questions-adapted from concerns raised by Imrey in
Semrau-about the procedures used to produce and analyze the brain
data."
1. Theoretical Rationale. Does the proffered brain-scan
study "have a plausible theoretical rationale, that is, a proposed
brain mechanism consistent with current physiological, neurobiological, and psychological knowledge?" "Are there plausible alternative
theoretical rationales regarding the underlying mechanisms that
make competing empirical predictions about how the technique
performs? What is the weight of evidence for competing theoretical
rationales?"
2. Measuring Brain Activation. Does the mental process
of legal relevance "reliably cause identifiable brain changes in
individuals," and are these changes measured by the brain-scanning
technology?
3. False Positives. "By what mechanisms might a [particular] response produce a false positive result with this technique?
What do practitioners of the technique do to counteract or correct for

77. For a general introduction to statistical inference in the context of law, see David
H. Kaye & David A.Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics,in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83 (2d ed. 2000).
78. Transcript of Proceedings Volume m at 355-56, United States v. Semrau, No. 07-cr10774 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2010).
79. This list is adapted, in some places verbatim, from the visual aids utilized by Dr.
Imrey during his testimony. See Exhibit 7, United States v. Semrau, No. 07-cr-10774, at
23-27 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2010).
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such mechanisms? Is this response to the possibility of false
positives reasonable considering the mechanisms involved?"
4. False Negatives. How "could a [particular] response
produce a false negative result? That is, what is the potential for
effective countermeasures? What do practitioners of the technique
do to counteract or correct for such phenomena? Is this response to
the possibility of false negatives and effective countermeasures
reasonable considering the mechanisms involved?"
5. Individual Differences. "Is it possible that measured
responses do not always have the same meaning [across individuals]
or that a test that works for some kinds of examinees or situations
will fail with others?"
6. Social Context. "How do the social context and the social
interactions that constitute the examination procedure affect the
reliability and validity of the recordings that are obtained?"
Brain scans are not presentations of raw data, but are graphical
representations of statistical results. Making legally relevant inferences
from brain scanning depends, then, on the details of the statistical tools
used. Those tools are never perfect, and courts should not expect them
to be. The imperfections should be laid bare, however, allowing for close
and careful examination of the validity of the expert's claims.
5. If Group-Averaged Data were Proffered, Can One Draw From
Them Legitimate Inferences About This One Individual?
It is an inferential challenge to move from group-averaged neuroscience data to individualized assessments. As David Faigman has put it,
"[wihile science attempts to discover the universals hiding among the
particulars, trial courts attempt to discover the particulars hiding among
the universals."
This is a problem courts are familiar with, as it
arises routinely in medical causation cases in which courts must
distinguish between general causation and specific causation.s' For
example, the fact that an ailment is often caused, in the general
80.

DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE INTHE LAW

69 (1999); see also David L. Faigman, The Limits of Science in the Courtroom, in BEYOND
COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 303 (Eugene Borgida &
Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
81. David L. Faigman, Evidentiary Incommensurability:A PreliminaryExplorationof
the Problem of Reasoning from General Scientific Data to Individualized Legal DecisionMaking, 75 BROOK L. REV. 1115, 1119, 1131 (2010).
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population, by a particular toxin doesn't relieve an individual plaintiff
who has that ailment from having to demonstrate that in his specific
case it was that particular toxin-and not some other substance-that
most likely caused his ailment.8 2
By analogy, even if a certain brain activation pattern is, on average
in a certain group, caused by a particular mental state, it does not
necessarily follow that the brain activation pattern of the specific
individual of legal relevance is caused by that particular mental state in
the individual. Thus, courts must be cautious in jumping from groupaveraged data to individual-level conclusions. In Semrau the group-toindividual problem was discussed many times in the course of testimony
and was mentioned by Judge Pham in his Report and Recommendation." Future cases will similarly require courts to evaluate how well
researchers have addressed this fundamental inferential problem.
The cognitive neuroscience of individual differences is only now
beginning to emerge." Thus, courts have a very limited evidence base
with which to evaluate individual inferences that are made based on
group-averaged brain-scan studies. While this will surely change in the
future, at present courts would be wise to err on the side of caution.
V.

CONCLUSION

The new and improving capacity for non-invasive, functional brain
scanning is exciting for the legal system. As with any new type of
scientific evidence, however, excitement must be tempered with a series
of cautions. Some of the cautions arise from the general challenges of
law/science interactions, which involve efforts to calibrate sensibly
between over- and under-inclusion, over- and under-credulousness, and
legitimate and illegitimate interpretations and applications. Some of the
cautions arise from the general gulf between disciplines, one of which
must be translated into and understood within the terms and contexts
of the other. And some of the cautions arise, as is so frequently the case
with new technologies, from challenges unique to themselves, relating
to the irreducible details of how this specific set of technologies works.

82. Id. at 1119.
83. Report and Recommendation, supra note 3, at 26 n. 16.
84. See, e.g., Ahmad R. Hariri, The Neurobiology of Individual Differences in Complex
Behavioral Traits, 32 ANN. REV. NEUROScI. 225 (2009). In describing the history of
neuroimaging during his testimony, Dr. Raichle noted that "we're beginning to work our
way back to getting at individual subjects, but it's challenging because you have far less
data to work with to get what you want to get out of it. It's far easier to talk about 33
people that did something than one." Transcript of Proceedings Volume II, supra note 33,
at 262.
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In this Article, we have attempted to provide a quick survey of many
of these challenges and to identify and illustrate issues that courts and
litigants will often encounter at this intersection. Neurolaw is not just
a fanciful fiction of the future. For better or worse, it is already entering
contemporary jurisprudence. As United States v. Semrau illustrates in
the brain-based lie detection context, attempts to use brain scans in legal
contexts will often precede the full appropriateness of doing so. Because
courts should anticipate encountering brain-scan evidence sooner rather
than later, symposia like the one reported in this Volume of the Mercer
Law Review are essential for fostering the necessary dialogue between
neuroscientists, judges, and lawyers that will lay the groundwork for
this neurolaw future.'

85. Those interested in following these interdisciplinary developments may wish to
subscribe to an email list-serv available through the MacArthur Foundation Law and
Neuroscience Project website at www.lawneuro.org.

